

Establishment Of Forced Labor In Turkestan For Logistic Work(During The First World War)

Ulugbek Kuchkarovich Ismoilov

Senior teacher of the department "Pedagogy and Psychology" of Toshkent-Perfect University, Republic of Uzbekistan

Abstract: The article provides a comparative historical analysis of the introduction by the tsarist government during the First World War of the mobilization of the indigenous inhabitants of the Turkestan region for rear work and its negative impact on the economy of the region. It is also given on historical examples, the existing socio-economic situation in the region, the shortage of labor, the involvement of the disabled to work, the transformation of forced labor into a mandatory tax.

Key words: Logistics, rear work, forced labor, military tax, Duma, Supreme Decree, Turkestan Governor-General, Kuropatkin.

INTRODUCTION

In 1914, the First World War began, which brought great suffering to the peoples of the world. Despite its remoteness from the front lines, its consequences did not bypass the Turkestan region. Initially, the Tsarist administration wanted to recruit the local population of the Turkestan region into military service. This issue was discussed several times in a special commission under the Minister of Military Affairs of Tsarist Russia, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Governor-General of Turkestan. However, after analyzing the possible consequences of this, it was decided to introduce a military tax instead of military conscription.

According to the law, the military tax was to be collected in all regions of the Turkestan region for a period of three years from 1915 to 1917 in the amount of twenty-one percent as an additional levy on the following taxes: the house tax, the state land tax, the land and state ration tax, the state taxes on urban real estate and commerce[1]. The local working population, already burdened by heavy taxes and levies, was forced to pay additional military taxes. In addition, it was forced to replace Russian peasants who had gone to the front with manual labor [2].

LITERATURE REVIEW

The process of mobilization of the population for labor service in the Turkestan Governorate during the First World War and its consequences were studied in the former Soviet Union by Broydo G.I. (1925), T. Riskulov (1929), F. Bozhko, S. Volin, P.G. Galuzo (1932), P.A. Kovalev (1957), Kh. Tursunov (1968), Kastelskaya Z.D. (1972) and others [3]. This topic was studied in the West by E.D. Sokol (1954, 2016), A. Morrison, K. Driu, A. Chokobaeva (2019), and others as one of the causes of the 1916 uprising in Turkestan [4]. During the years of independence, it was studied by the first from Uzbekistan by Hamid Ziyoev (1992, 2003), Zoir Choriev, and from Russia by Glushenko Ye.A. (2010) and others [5].

RESEARCH METHODS

The article is based on generally accepted historical methods - historicism, comparative-logical analysis, sequence, and objectivity. It describes the process of mobilization of the population for labor for front-line work in the Turkestan Governor-General during the First World War, its consequences, and the suffering suffered by our people.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The problem of labor shortage in Turkestan was a common occurrence. The meeting of governors and officials also noted the difficult situation in providing labor in cotton growing. The shortage of labor in the main (cotton) regions of Turkestan began to be felt since 1908. According to experts, this shortage was determined by 100 thousand workers by 1912. During the difficult days of cotton planting and harvesting, thousands of workers from neighboring countries came to the cotton regions of Turkestan. During the First World War, the area under cotton cultivation increased by another 100 thousand hectares, reaching approximately 744 thousand hectares by 1916.

As a result of the increase in cotton crops during the war years and the reduction in the flow of workers from Uyghuristan, Afghanistan, Iran and Bukhara, the labor shortage became even more acute.

This situation led to the peasants becoming homeless and becoming slaves. Because the colonialists, who felt the need for more labor, were interested in depopulating the peasants in various ways and turning them into cheap or free laborers - slaves in exchange for confiscating their land and property [5].

In such a difficult situation, on June 25, 1916, the Tsar's supreme decree on the supply of laborers for work behind the front was announced [6]. As expected, this news caused great discontent and riots. Because the decree was announced in the summer during the harvest season, when there was a shortage of labor.

The authorities in St. Petersburg warned that while labor was needed, it was also a matter of state importance to harvest the cotton crop on time without losses[7].

According to additional instructions from the Governor-General of Turkestan, recruitment for front-line work was to be carried out in two stages: first, men from the population of "foreign nations" aged 19 to 31, and then from 32 to 43 [8]. At first, the authorities did not know the expected contingent of conscripts. A few days after the Tsar's decree was signed, Martson, the acting Governor-General of the region, who was then in Petrograd, sent a telegram to the Turkestan Governor-General, informing him of the planned recruitment of 250,000 workers from Turkestan [9].

This figure was 8 percent of the male population (3,434,349) in the provinces and districts of Turkestan[10], and was organized in the form of a centralized general duty distribution. Only in the cotton districts was the previous order maintained at less than 8 percent.

The practice of hiring other workers to replace oneself was fully legalized. But this was a huge problem. However, by 1916, when the labor shortage in the country was estimated at 400-600 thousand people, this issue could not be easily solved.

In order to calm the people and please the government, the colonial authorities of the country introduced the practice of mass recruitment of laborers from the entire population "with due observance of social justice"[11]. As a result, the socio-economic situation of the population worsened.

In the cities of Ferghana, citing a labor shortage, a general tax of 50 rubles and more per household was introduced under the pretext of hiring workers from outside [12].

The poorer sections of the population were especially severely affected. They were forced to work among peoples who were completely different from them in language, religion, and mentality, and in distant lands with completely different climates and nature, or were forced to pay 50-100 soums, which was equivalent to the price of a horse, in exchange for temporary release [13]. A poor family, usually working as a quartermaster, could not afford this amount.

The amount of the "compensation tax," initially set at 50 soums, was later increased to one hundred rubles or more per household [14]. Paying this amount of compensation was a burden even for a well-off family and the small wealthy.

Since it was not possible to mass recruit workers from outside for money, farms were required to hire workers personally, not for money. This was a very difficult task. Labor was also a serious problem. The reason was that in most cases, the entire family was supported by one person. If he left, the family would surely be left hungry and neglected. But the colonial administration was not interested in this situation.

Due to the continuous collection of money, extortion, bribery, etc., carried out against the background of food shortages and high prices, the discontent of the people began to grow. Fearing a recurrence of the uprising, the colonial administration abolished the practice of recruiting workers from individual farms and switched to a system of neighborhood work. Umumiy amaliyotga yangi usul - jamoaviy usulda, butun jamiyat tomonidan o'z jamiyati tarkibidan ishchilarni yollash usuli joriy qilindi[15].

Workers recruited for front-line work were now considered to have been sent for mobilization by the whole of society. New forms of collective support and even superficial nobility now served as pretexts for mass collection and extortion, extortion, requisition.

The campaign to recruit workers turned into a new and very difficult financial and labor obligation for the bulk of the local population. Part of the population was forced to provide labor. Another part had to raise funds for the support of front-line workers and their families, but usually on a scale much larger than was required for their actual needs.

The most difficult, of course, was the labor obligation. Departure to distant, unknown and foreign lands was terrifying with its unusualness, real and potential dangers. Because the construction of defensive structures in the rear area meant working in the territory of the active army - on the battlefield, under a hail of bullets and missiles. At the same time, the deprivation of workers, who were often the only breadwinners of the family, seriously undermined the material support of peasant and artisan families.

But paying money "for the benefit of workers going to the rear" became a heavy, onerous obligation for broad segments of the population. Cases of forced collection increased excessively and literally took on the appearance of mass taxation. The amount of money collected varied. Often it ranged from 100 to 300 rubles. In Kokand, there were also unpleasant cases when collectors demanded 500 rubles or more from each family[16]. If we consider that at that time the price of one horse was 50 rubles (sums), it becomes clear that this amount was indeed a much larger amount. Of course, each farm could have saved itself from the terrible new tax by sending one person to work in the rear. But this measure of salvation was no better than nothing. After all, any lump-sum benefits promised by the colonial administration and unreliable promises of assistance to the families of front-line workers could not compensate for the loss of labor and breadwinners for the families. But that was not all. That is, the population had to fulfill both the physical labor obligation and the new tax obligation. The Governor-General of Turkestan specifically emphasized on December 31, 1916 that "the appointment to labor obligation should not be considered as a "ground for deferring payments""[17].

The monetary tax was extremely heavy and burdensome in all cases, even when it was differentiated in proportion to the financial situation of families.

Representatives of the population, who were afraid to express their dissatisfaction openly, now filed official appeals - complaints to the local colonial administration. Through complaints, a complete exemption from monetary dues or (in some cases) a reduction was requested. As it turned out, the monetary obligation also applied to men of draft age, workers in general, and households that were not able to work, in particular, families of widows and orphans[18].

On August 23, 1916, the order of the Governor-General of Turkestan No. 220 on the mobilization of the indigenous population for work behind the front, with four large annexes, was published. By this order, those exempted from labor obligations and even foreign citizens were involved in paying a new tax. The situation reached such a point that the elders and elders demanded that the sick, crippled, and disabled people released by the medical commission pay money for "self-taxation".

In the city of Samarkand, the colonial administration shamelessly demanded that the blind and incapable of work pay a fee to go to labor obligations or send someone else in their place. Tsarist authorities in the Ferghana region demanded 60-100 rubles from each of 40 blind beggars (from different neighborhoods) living in the Dakhma at the Shahonam cemetery in the Margilan district of the city of Kokand.

The most terrible happened in Kattakurgan. The village elder of Kalkurgan demanded that the leper village send five workers or pay for them. However, their village was exempt from the labor supply as lepers [19]. Most of the peasant and artisan families were unable to pay the full amount demanded of them [20].

Due to the lack of cash, poor families were often forced to mortgage their property, livestock, and land to pay the new tax. This meant that they took out a loan with the condition that their property would be confiscated if they did not pay on time. This is usually how the situation always ended.

There were even cases when "childless widows, whose only wealth was a dilapidated farmstead, were forced to sell it in order to fulfill their labor obligations"[21]. This is certainly a tragedy, but it would be wrong to expect more from the colonists and their servants.

In general, the new tax, due to its excessiveness, caused great damage to the material and property situation of wide sections of the local population. The local ulus governor, Ishmatbay Mirzo Aliev, collected a huge sum of 12 thousand rubles from the residents of the Oqsaroy village of the Olmos ulus in the Namangan district to provide workers, and this situation greatly affected the well-being of the population due to the poor harvest year.

In the city of Kokand, according to the information of the security service, there were rumors among the local population that "the Committee for the Supply of Workers for the Trench Work Behind the Active Troops is severely harassing them by demanding money for the expenses associated with the supply of workers."

Facts and complaints about excessive and uncontrolled collection of money from the local population, mainly in Ferghana, reached Petrograd. The State Duma reported that in order to pay the new tax, the majority of the

population was selling their last cows and livestock at half price, or mortgaged their homes to moneylenders to get loans. As a result, the entire population was forced to sell everything they owned in order to earn cash, and there was no one to borrow money. As a result, prices for livestock fell sharply. Due to the impossibility of repaying the debt, housing often passed into the hands of moneylenders at low prices [22].

On September 27, 1916, General Frolov, who was acting as Minister of War of the Tsarist government, sent a special telegram to the governor-general of the region. In it, based on information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, some ulus administrators (Russian officers, the colonial administration responsible for the work) through village elders and foremen, under the pretext of providing benefits to those called up for labor, However, they noted that they had raised money in an amount far higher than the actual need.

The Ministry of War had in mind the Ferghana region and several of its uluses. But the Governor-General of Turkestan knew more about the abuses that were taking place. Therefore, the Governor-General of Turkestan, Kuropatkin, sent the following reply to the Minister of War: "The information received about the abuses of the officials of the local administration of the Fergana region... has serious grounds. The abuses and very large levies, the involvement of workers in mobilization, served as a source of wealth for many. There is a huge amount of work ahead to eliminate the above abuses, and it will not be limited to the Ferghana region alone [23]". In the end, Kuropatkin promised to step up the fight against individuals in the administration who were involved in collecting money. However, in practice, no measures were taken. Because, while the regional governors fearlessly collect large sums of money from the heads of the uluses through various frauds, extortions, and bribes through village elders and elders, and embezzle a large part of it, it is hard to believe that the governor-general does not have a share or simply turns a blind eye!

Indeed, frauds based on hiring workers were committed in the heart of the country - in Tashkent, one might say, in the vicinity of the governor-general's residence. In the old part of Tashkent, in connection with the involvement of local residents in trench work, from 5,000 to 40,000 rubles were collected from each neighborhood. Since the collection of money was disproportionate to the income of the local population, many went into debt. Those who did not have money issued promissory notes stating that they owed money in the amount they had to pay or mortgaged their property.

The most interesting thing is that these collections were carried out in complete secrecy. "When collecting money, the elikbashi said that these collections should be hidden from the government, from whom they received how much, and for what purpose they should issue receipts for the money received, not in full, but only partially. For example, if 200-300 rubles were received, they would issue a receipt for 20-30 rubles, explaining such a receipt by the fact that a new loan of 3 billion rubles was expected in the near future, and if the authorities found out that the people were rich, they could force them to subscribe to this loan.

In some villages, contrary to the order of the Governor-General of Turkestan, the élikbashi did not issue receipts at all when collecting money" [25]. In any case, much was done in the provincial center in a rather "civilized" manner. That is, in practice money was collected - but on paper everything was in order!

The "local" administration was particularly affected by the greed and greed for money, especially in the cotton-growing areas. The colonial administration, aware of the shortage of workers in the cotton fields and the government's instructions to reduce the number of workers in the cotton-growing areas, resorted to extortion and extortion with extraordinary zeal.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that during the First World War, the colonial authorities in Turkestan, demanding the fulfillment of "civil duties", attracted the population of the country to various material and labor obligations.

Since 1908, the shortage of labor in the country began to be noticeable. By 1912, the shortage of labor amounted to about 100 thousand people, and by 1916 this figure had reached about 400-600 thousand people. In addition, the colonial government demanded that the country provide 250 thousand laborers for work behind the front.

Well aware of the shortage of labor, the colonial administration in the country and their agents decided to use the situation to accumulate wealth for their own purposes. At first, they collected 50-100 soums from each farm, which was equal to the price of one horse. Then, it abdicated its responsibility by leaving it to local communities to find workers and provide for them and their families.

As a result, the deprivation of workers, who were often the sole breadwinners of the family, seriously undermined the material security of peasant and artisan families. Most peasant and artisan families were unable to pay the full amount demanded of them[26].

Due to the lack of cash, impoverished families were often forced to pledge their property, livestock, and land to pay the new tax. This meant that loans were taken out with the condition that their property would be confiscated if they were not paid on time. There were even cases when “childless widows, whose only wealth was a dilapidated courtyard, were forced to sell it in order to fulfill their labor obligation”[27].

It is said that the majority of the population sold their last cows and livestock at half price to pay the new tax, or mortgaged the houses they lived in to usurers in order to get a loan. As a result, the entire population was forced to sell everything they owned in order to earn cash, and there was no one who could afford it. Therefore, prices for livestock fell sharply. Due to the impossibility of repaying the debt, housing often passed into the hands of usurers at low prices [28]. In general, the new tax, due to its excessiveness, caused great damage to the material and property situation of wide sections of the local population.

REFERENCES

1. Турсунов Х. Восстание 1916 года в Средней Азии и Казахстане. – Ташкент-1962 г. С. 184
2. National Archive of Uzbekistan, I-1st Fund, List 1, Volume 1136, Sheet 1.
3. С. Понятовский. «Обеспечение хлопководства рабочими руками в Туркестане». Доклад на съезде хлопководов Туркестана. Т. 1913 г.
4. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 14.
5. Валиев А.Х. Положение дехканства Ферганы в конце XIX – начале XX веков. Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1958 г. Стр. – 49.
6. Восстание 1916 года в Средней Азии. Сборник документов под редакцией П.Г. Галузо. Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1932 г. Стр. – 13. Доклад Самаркандского военного губернатора Лыкошина. Декабрь 1916 г.
7. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1127, 1916, sheet 6.
8. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1100, sheets 87,90
9. «Восстание 1916 года в Средней Азии и Казахстане», сб. документов, Под редакцией А.В.Пяковского Москва Издательство академии наук СССР – 1960 г. стр. 96,
10. Ганин Андрей «Уроки туркестанского восстания» 05.07.2016 Родина - Федеральный выпуск: №7(716)
11. РГВИА. Ф. 165. Оп. 1. Д. 1553. Л. 1об. 1916 г.
12. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 41.
13. Hamid Ziyoev. Jahon urushi va o'zbeklar. «O'zbekiston adabiyoti va san'ati» gazetasi. 2003 yil 9-may, 19 (3701)-son. B. 2
14. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1128, 1916, sheet 27.
15. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 43.
16. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1157, 1916. Sheets 275 - 280; sheets 319 – 321.
17. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1159, 1916, sheet 310.
18. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1094, 1916, page 13; volume 1149, 1916, pages 302, 300, 324.
19. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 46-47.
20. National Archive of Uzbekistan. I-1 Fund List 31, Volume 1157, 1916. Sheets 275 -281.
21. National Archive of Uzbekistan. I-1 Fund List 31, Volume 1100, 1916. Sheet 283.
22. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 47.
23. National Archive of Uzbekistan. Fund I-1, list 31, volume 1135, 1916, sheet 368.

-
24. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 48.
25. National Archive of Uzbekistan. I-1 Fund List 31, Volume 1093, 1916. Sheets 135 - 136; Sheets 167 - 168
26. National Archive of Uzbekistan. I-1 Fund List 31, Volume 1157, 1916. Sheets 275 -281.
27. National Archive of Uzbekistan. I-1 Fund List 31, Volume 1100, 1916. Sheet 283.
28. Ковалев П.А. Тыловые рабочие Туркестана в годы первой мировой войны (1916 г. – май 1917 г.). Ташкент. «Государственное издательство Узбекской ССР – 1957 г. Стр. – 47.