

Socio-Philosophical Analysis Of The Interrelationship Between Legal Culture And Social Values

Soliyev Jasurbek Isroilovich,

History Teacher at School No. 70, Namangan District

E-mail: jasur1986@gmail.com

Abstract. This article analyzes the interrelationship between legal culture and social values from a socio-philosophical perspective. It substantiates that legal culture is a complex social phenomenon that is not limited merely to legal knowledge or compliance with existing laws, but is also associated with the value-based attitude of the individual and society toward law, the understanding of principles such as justice, freedom, equality, human dignity, responsibility, legality, and social solidarity, and their manifestation in everyday activity.

Keywords: legal culture, social value, axiology, legal consciousness, law, justice, freedom, equality, human dignity, responsibility, rule of law, social institution, civil society.

Introduction. At every historical stage of social development, there has been an inseparable connection between the legal norms regulating relations among people and the values that constitute the moral and axiological foundation of those relations. Law does not develop outside society, while social values cannot become stable social relations without specific normative and institutional mechanisms. In this sense, legal culture serves as a distinctive socio-philosophical connecting mechanism between the values recognized by society and the legal norms currently in force.

Understanding legal culture in modern society merely as the level of knowledge of laws narrows its content. Legal culture is defined by an individual's acceptance of law as a value, understanding the principles of justice and freedom embodied in it, recognizing the rights of others while exercising one's own rights, feeling social responsibility, and transforming lawful behavior into an internal need. Thus, the qualitative level of legal culture is broader than the volume of legal knowledge and is characterized by the formation of a value-based attitude toward law.

In axiology, value is interpreted as a fundamental category expressing the content of phenomena, ideals, principles, and goals regarded as significant for the individual and society. Values are formed in connection with society's historical experience, social needs, and future-oriented goals [1]. From this perspective, such values as justice, freedom, equality, human honor and dignity, legality, social solidarity, and responsibility constitute both the conceptual and practical foundations of modern legal culture.

Main Part. The concept of legal culture is, in terms of its content, a multilayered social phenomenon. To understand it, legal knowledge, legal consciousness, legal values, legal behavior, and legal institutions should be considered not as isolated elements, but as an interconnected system. Legal culture is one of the social criteria that reflects both the actual state of law in society and people's attitudes toward law.

Conceptual approaches to the social nature of legal culture emphasize that the legal system cannot exist separately from political, economic, and cultural development. Legal institutions are not only the result of social change, but also function as mechanisms that influence the pace and direction of changes in society [2]. From this perspective, legal culture is an important component of the two-way relationship between law and society.

Legal culture cannot be studied separately from social values. This is because every legal system acquires legitimacy on the basis of particular values. The mere existence of a law does not mean that it is automatically accepted by society as a value. Its social legitimacy is strengthened only when the content of the law is consistent with justice, equality, human dignity, and other fundamental social values. Conversely, when a deep discrepancy emerges between a legal norm and the prevailing values of society, a contradiction arises between the formal operation of the norm and its social acceptance.

Studies devoted to the relationship between law and culture demonstrate that it is insufficient to interpret law as an autonomous normative system isolated from social life. Legal ideas, institutions, and practices must be

studied in connection with society's historical experience, social relations, moral norms, and cultural perceptions [3]. This approach makes it possible to interpret legal culture as the manifestation of values in legal form.

From a socio-philosophical perspective, three main levels of legal culture can be distinguished. The first is the cognitive level, which encompasses an individual's knowledge of law, legislation, rights, and duties. The second is the axiological level, which expresses the individual's value-based attitude toward law, justice, legality, human rights, and state institutions. The third is the behavioral level, which refers to the manifestation of acquired legal knowledge and values in practical action.

Among these three levels, the axiological component is of particular importance. A person may know the law, but if he or she does not accept it as a value, knowledge alone does not guarantee legal behavior. When a person complies with the law only out of fear of punishment, external legal order may be maintained, but this does not indicate a mature legal culture. At a high level of legal culture, lawful behavior is transformed from external compulsion into internal conviction and responsibility.

In axiological concepts concerning the essence of values, value appears as a criterion that guides human goals and actions. Values influence not only individual choice, but also the general normative structure of society [5]. In this regard, identifying which values an individual considers a priority is of particular importance in the formation of legal behavior.

Within the structure of legal culture, the value of justice occupies a particularly important place. Justice is one of the most stable normative ideals in the historical development of law and expresses proportionality between the individual and society, rights and duties, freedom and responsibility. Citizens' trust in legal institutions also depends to a considerable extent on social perceptions of the fairness of those institutions' activities.

The function of justice in legal culture manifests itself in two directions. First, it serves as a criterion for evaluating existing legal norms. Second, it provides an axiological orientation for the formation of new legal norms. As social perceptions of justice change, the requirements imposed on the legal system also change. Therefore, one of the important sources of legal development is the transformation of values in society.

The second fundamental value of legal culture is freedom. Freedom implies an individual's ability to realize his or her potential, make choices, and participate in social relations as an independent subject. However, in the socio-philosophical sense, freedom is not equated with absolute arbitrariness. The exercise of one person's freedom must not negate the rights and freedoms of another. Therefore, law is not merely a mechanism for defining the limits of freedom, but also a social institution that coordinates the freedoms of different individuals.

In Hegel's philosophy of right, law is also associated with the realization of freedom in a particular social form. Legal relations acquire objective content through social structures such as individual will, civil society, and the state [9]. From this standpoint, legal culture requires freedom to be understood not only from the perspective of individual interest, but also within the framework of the common social interest and mutual recognition.

Another important foundation of legal culture is the value of equality. Legal equality does not mean that all individuals have the same social status; rather, it means that they are equally recognized as subjects of law. Equality before the law is a necessary condition for the universality of law and the principle of justice. If legal norms do not function effectively for certain groups because of social status, economic opportunities, or other factors, a gap emerges between formal and substantive forms of legal equality.

This reveals another feature of legal culture: legal culture is assessed not by the declarative principles contained in the text of the law, but by the extent to which those principles are manifested in everyday social practice.

In the interrelationship between legal culture and social values, human dignity emerges as a fundamental axiological criterion. In modern philosophy of law, the human being is regarded not merely as an object of legal relations or an individual governed by the state, but as a subject possessing intrinsic value. Therefore, recognition of human dignity changes the essence of the relationship between the state and the individual: the criterion of state activity becomes not the management of the individual, but the provision and protection of his or her rights and opportunities.

This axiological content of legal culture is also reflected in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan in its new edition. The Preamble to the Constitution explicitly affirms commitment to human rights and

freedoms, national and universal values, as well as the ideas of democracy, freedom, equality, social justice, and solidarity. In addition, Article 13 defines the human being, his or her life, freedom, honor, dignity, and other inalienable rights as the highest value [11]. These provisions express the axiological orientation of the legal system.

Another important type of value in the formation of legal culture is responsibility. Freedom and responsibility are not mutually exclusive, but complementary categories. Just as an individual must understand his or her own rights, he or she must also be capable of understanding the consequences of personal actions for other people and for society. Otherwise, the absolutization of rights may lead to destructive forms of individualism. The socio-philosophical content of the concept of legal responsibility is broader than juridical liability. While juridical liability refers to the legal consequences that follow a violation of law, socio-legal responsibility is associated with an individual's conscious conduct based on anticipating possible legal consequences. In a mature legal culture, responsibility is transformed from a repressive mechanism into a preventive and moral-axiological mechanism.

A dialectical analysis of the relationship between legal culture and values shows that it is incorrect to interpret one merely as a cause and the other only as a consequence. While social values influence the content of law, law itself also changes the social status of values. Once the law recognizes a particular value as an object of legal protection, the institutional status of that value in society is strengthened.

For example, although human dignity initially emerged as a universal value shaped within philosophical, moral, and religious thought, as a result of modern constitutional development it has become a direct legal principle. Thus, value shapes law, while law institutionalizes that value. This process can be understood as a continuous social mechanism in the form of "value – norm – institution – behavior – new value-based experience."

Theories concerning comparative research on legal culture note that the concept of "legal culture" is interpreted in different ways. In some studies, it is viewed as a variable explaining legal behavior, whereas in other approaches it is treated as an analytical category through which law itself is examined as a cultural phenomenon [4]. This indicates that the essence of legal culture cannot be determined through a single indicator.

When assessing the level of development of legal culture, the number of laws, the availability of legal information, or the large number of legal organizations are not sufficient criteria. Trust in legal institutions, citizens' ability to protect their rights through lawful means, intolerance toward violations of law, respect for the rights of others, the habit of using legal mechanisms, and social demand for justice are qualitative indicators that determine legal culture.

In this process, the rule of law becomes a distinct social value. The rule of law means not only compliance with the law by state authorities, but also the acceptance of law by members of society as a common and just social order. Comparative studies of cultural values and governance institutions across different countries have shown a significant relationship between value orientations in national culture and institutions such as the rule of law, attitudes toward corruption, and democratic accountability [6]. This means that the effectiveness of legal reforms depends not only on the adoption of new legal norms, but also on the formation of a value environment that supports them.

The institutional dimension of legal culture is also important. Legal values do not arise spontaneously in the consciousness of the individual. The family, education system, mahalla, state bodies, courts, mass media, civil society institutions, and other social structures are active agents in the process of legal socialization. Through interaction with these institutions, the individual develops perceptions of justice, legality, rights, duty, responsibility, and trust.

From this perspective, the consistency between formal legal advocacy and practical institutional activity is of decisive importance. If the rule of law is promoted in the educational process, but a citizen encounters injustice or bureaucratic obstacles when resolving a legal problem in real life, a gap emerges between normative knowledge and social experience. Such a situation may intensify legal nihilism, distrust, and legal alienation. Therefore, the formation of legal culture is not merely a matter of educational and awareness-raising activity. It must be reinforced by the practical activity of state and social institutions. The actual functioning of law in everyday life is one of the strongest factors of legal education.

P. Bourdieu analyzes the legal field as a social field with its own internal rules, professional actors, and relations of knowledge and power [8]. From this approach, it becomes clear that in the formation of legal culture, not only the text of the law matters, but also who interprets it, how it is applied, and how legal decisions are received in society. The authority of legal institutions may strengthen trust in legal values or, conversely, weaken it.

J. Habermas's communicative approach to law and democracy also makes it possible to understand this issue more deeply. In his conception, modern democratic law is regarded not merely as the result of state will, but as a social phenomenon connected with citizens' communicative participation, public deliberation, and legitimacy [7]. On this basis, the formation of legal culture should include not one-sided legal advocacy, but also a culture in which members of society discuss legal issues, participate in decision-making processes, and express their interests in lawful forms.

The category of trust also occupies a special place in the socio-philosophical essence of legal culture. A legal system cannot function sustainably through coercive power alone. When citizens trust legal institutions, the social basis for voluntary compliance with legal norms expands. When trust declines, even well-designed laws may have limited practical effectiveness.

Therefore, the axiological structure of legal culture is based on the organic interconnection of "justice – trust – legality – responsibility." Fair institutional activity increases trust in institutions; trust encourages lawful behavior; and lawful behavior, in turn, strengthens social responsibility and stability.

E. Durkheim's views on social solidarity provide an important methodological basis for understanding the role of law in social integration. According to him, changes in the forms of solidarity within society are also reflected in the character of law [10]. This approach makes it possible to interpret law not merely as a coercive force, but as a normative mechanism that ensures social unity.

Accordingly, another important value of legal culture is social solidarity. Law does not merely restrict the interests of individuals; it serves to create a balance among different interests, groups, and social positions. Legal solidarity develops when an individual understands the rights of others not as competitors to his or her own rights, but as a necessary condition of the common legal order.

The relevance of this issue for Uzbek society is also significant. State policy aimed at raising legal consciousness and legal culture in society defines tasks such as ensuring the continuity of legal education, increasing the legal knowledge of the population, and cultivating a spirit of respect for the law [12]. From a socio-philosophical perspective, however, the effectiveness of these tasks depends on supplementing legal advocacy with value-based content.

For example, explaining a legal norm to a citizen represents a primary level, whereas explaining which social value that law protects constitutes a higher level of legal education. A person may know that corruption is prohibited, but rejecting corruption at the level of internal conviction as a phenomenon contrary to equality, justice, integrity, and the common good represents a qualitatively higher stage of legal culture.

Likewise, alongside knowing the norms concerning human rights, an individual must recognize human dignity as a universal value. Otherwise, legal knowledge may acquire a utilitarian character, and a citizen may use law only as a means of protecting personal interests. Legal culture, however, presupposes not only the protection of one's own rights, but also the recognition of the rights of others.

Analysis of the relationship between legal culture and social values reveals another important regularity: the stability of legal culture depends not on the degree of external control, but on the extent to which legal values are internalized by the individual. In other words, if lawful behavior is manifested only when control is present, this is not a sign of stable legal culture. Only when the content of law becomes integrated into the individual's internal system of values does legal behavior acquire a relatively independent and stable character.

On this basis, the following conceptual mechanism for the formation of legal culture can be proposed: social value → awareness of the value → reinforcement through a legal norm → implementation by social institutions → internalization through personal experience → internal legal conviction → lawful and responsible behavior.

A reverse relationship also exists in this process. Citizens' legal practices and new social needs may lead to the reinterpretation of existing values. Thus, legal culture is not a static phenomenon, but a dynamic system that transforms together with the development of society.

Conclusion. A socio-philosophical analysis of the relationship between legal culture and social values demonstrates that these two phenomena form an inseparable, mutually conditioned system that is undergoing continuous transformation. It is insufficient to define the essence of legal culture merely through knowledge of laws or external compliance with them. Its principal content is determined by the acceptance of law by the individual and society as a social value, the transformation of legal principles into internal conviction, and their manifestation in everyday activity.

REFERENCES

1. Nazarov Q. Qadriyatlar falsafasi (Aksiologiya). – Toshkent, 2004. – 85 b.
2. Friedman L.M. Legal Culture and Social Development // *Law & Society Review*. – 1969. – Vol. 4. – No. 1. – P. 29–44.
3. Cotterrell R. *Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory*. – Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. – 198 p.
4. Nelken D. Comparative Legal Research and Legal Culture: Facts, Approaches, and Values // *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*. – 2016. – Vol. 12. – P. 45–62. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084950.
5. Schwartz S.H. An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values // *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*. – 2012. – Vol. 2. – No. 1. DOI: 10.9707/2307-0919.1116.
6. Licht A.N., Goldschmidt C., Schwartz S.H. Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance // *Journal of Comparative Economics*. – 2007. – Vol. 35. – No. 4. – P. 659–688. DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2007.09.001.
7. Habermas J. *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Translated by William Rehg. – Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998. – 676 p.
8. Bourdieu P. The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field // *Hastings Law Journal*. – 1987. – Vol. 38. – P. 814–853.
9. Hegel G.W.F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Ed. A.W. Wood; trans. H.B. Nisbet. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
10. Durkheim E. *The Division of Labor in Society*. Translated by George Simpson. – New York: The Free Press, 1947.
11. O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Konstitutsiyasi. Yangi tahrir. 2023-yil 30-aprel kuni referendum orqali qabul qilingan. – Toshkent, 2023.
12. O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Prezidentining 2019-yil 9-yanvardagi PF–5618-son “Jamiyatda huquqiy ong va huquqiy madaniyatni yuksaltirish tizimini tubdan takomillashtirish to‘g‘risida”gi Farmoni.